International Society on Dynamic Games

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June 22, 2021

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

June 24, 2021 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Montreal time, UTC -4)

Double marginalization and external financing: Capacity investment under uncertainty

 

Peter M. Kort – Tiburg University, Netherlands

Peter M. Kort

Webinar link
Webinar ID: 881 6070 4034
Passcode: 095916

This paper considers a firm’s investment decision within an uncertain framework, where the investment is financed by borrowing. The lender has market power, generating a capital market inefficiency. The investment decision involves determining the timing and the capacity level. The firm’s investment is subject to double marginalization in the sense that the lender’s market power results in a considerably smaller investment and therefore leads to a reduction in welfare. Introducing the bankruptcy option 34 reveals that the double marginalization effect is mitigated in a scenario with high bankruptcy cost and large enough demand uncertainty: the firm’s investment size is increasing in bankruptcy costs albeit at the expense of an investment delay. As a result, the bankruptcy option can increase (total) welfare.

 

(joint work with Herbert Dawid, Nick F.D. Huberts, Kuno J.M. Huisman, and Xingang Wen)

Published by Sergey Kumkov
June 14, 2021

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

June 17, 2021 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Montreal time, UTC -4)

A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities

 

Artem Sedakov – Saint Petersburg State University, Russia

Artem Sedakov

Webinar link
Webinar ID: 881 6070 4034
Passcode: 095916

In this talk, we investigate a model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities. We suppose that firms, which are located along the river flow, produce goods and compete in a market. The production results in water pollution, and the pollution emissions of a firm can influence downstream counterparts. We analyze this model in detail by incorporating a firm’s location and analytically comparing equilibrium and cooperative behavior. Additionally, we examine the model under myopic behavior where firms place no weight on their future gains.

 

Published by Sergey Kumkov
June 7, 2021

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

June 10, 2021 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Montreal time, UTC -4)

Stable networks and dynamic network formation with group partitioning

 

Ping Sun – Saint Petersburg State University, Russia

Ping Sun

Webinar link
Webinar ID: 881 6070 4034
Passcode: 095916

Two models of network formation with the players partitioned into groups are introduced. In the first model, we examine the influence of four utility functions on the set of stable networks. The costs involved into a player’s utility are affected by the given partition in different ways. Comparisons of conditions for specific network structures to be stable under various utility functions are presented. In the second model, we characterize the stable networks generated by a process of players’ interactions with incomplete information. Players meet randomly and sequentially, myopically updating their links in dynamics. Comparison of the cases under complete and incomplete information is provided.

 

(Joint work with Elena Parilina)

Published by Sergey Kumkov
June 2, 2021

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

June 3, 2021 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Montreal time, UTC -4)

The impact of product recall on advertising decisions and firm profit while envisioning crisis or being hazard myopic

 

Arka Mukherjee – HEC Montréal, Canada

Arka Mukherjee

Webinar link
Webinar ID: 881 6070 4034
Passcode: 095916

 

During a product recall, a firm at fault may incur a long-term damage in goodwill. Strategic use of advertising recovers lost goodwill and mitigates the damages made by a product recall. In this paper, using a goodwill based model under a differential game framework, we analyze the equilibrium strategies of two competing manufacturers when either one firm or both can issue a product recall at a random time, and investigate (i) the firms’ equilibrium advertising strategies (ii) analyze the impact of the recall on a firm’s profit (iii) introduce and investigate the effect of "hazard myopia" (a firm’s inability to foresee the crisis likelihood) on a firm’s advertising decisions and profit. 

Published by Sergey Kumkov
May 24, 2021

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

May 27, 2021 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Montreal time, UTC -4)

Groundwater extraction for irrigation purposes: The case of asymmetric players

 

Jesús Marín Solano – Universitat de Barcelona, Spain

Jesús Marín Solano

Webinar link
Webinar ID: 881 6070 4034
Passcode: 095916

We address the problem of groundwater exploitation by heterogeneous farmers for irrigation purposes. We build a two-player differential game in which the players show different characteristics related to their agricultural activity. Subgame perfect noncooperative and cooperative solutions are studied. The model is applied to the case study of the Western La Mancha aquifer. Numerical results show that the more heterogeneous the farmers are, the less inefficient is the allocation of water under non-cooperation with respect to cooperation. Moreover, cooperation is beneficial for the environment, but not always for both farmers when the water demand differs highly among the users.

 

(with Valeriia Chukaeva and Julia de Frutos Cachorro).

Published by Sergey Kumkov
May 17, 2021

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

May 20, 2021 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Montreal time, UTC -4)

Graph-constrained dynamic choice

 

Vivek Borkar – Department of Electrical Engineering, IIT Bombay, India

Vivek Borkar

Webinar link
Webinar ID: 881 6070 4034
Passcode: 095916

In this talk, I introduce a model of graph-constrained dynamic choice with reinforcement modeled by positively α-homogeneous rewards. Its empirical process, which can be written as a stochastic approximation recursion with Markov noise, has the same probability law as a certain vertex reinforced random walk. Thus, the limiting differential equation that it tracks coincides with the forward Kolmogorov equation for the latter, which in turn is a scaled version of a special instance of replicator dynamics with potential. This equivalence is exploited to show that for α>0, the asymptotic outcome concentrates around the optimum in a certain limiting sense when 'annealed' by letting α slowly.

 

(Joint work with Konstantin Avrachenkov, Sharayu Moharir and Suhail Mohmad Shah.)

Published by Sergey Kumkov
May 15, 2021
Dear Colleague,

Thank you for your interest in presenting your work at the next International Symposium on Dynamic Games. Due to the ongoing international situation, unfortunately we have had to yet again postpone our event. The new dates planned are July 25-28 2022, at the same location in Porto, when we sincerely hope that we can run it without further problem. Given the time that has elapsed, we will be starting a new abstract submission process. Abstracts will be accepted from now on. We would be very happy to receive your abstract, either on the same or a new/updated topic.

We hope to see you in Porto in 2022.

Yours,

Mark Broom and Alberto A. Pinto
Organizers
Published by Sergey Kumkov
May 11, 2021
Last Call Virtual Workshop
 
On Friday, 28 May 2021, Ngo Van Long and Florian Wagener shall organize a one-day virtual workshop on Dynamic games in environmental economics and management. This workshop is connected to the Special Issue of Dynamic Games and Applications on the same topic, for which submissions are accepted until June 30, 2021. Participation in the workshop is neither necessary nor sufficient for acceptance in the Special Issue, but at least one of the editors will be in the audience of your talk.
 
To register for the workshop, send an e-mail with the title and abstract (at most 200 words) of your talk to
f.o.o.wagener@uva.nl before Friday 21 May, 13:00 CEST.
Published by Sergey Kumkov
May 10, 2021

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

 

May 13, 2021 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Montreal time, UTC -4)

 

Affirmative action in large population contests

Ratul Lahkar – Ashoka University, India

Ratul Lahkar

Webinar link
Webinar ID: 881 6070 4034
Passcode: 095916

 

We consider affirmative action in large population Tullock contests. The standard Tullock contest is an equal treatment contest in which agents who exert equal effort have an equal probability of success. In contrast, under affirmative action, agents with equal cost of effort have equal probability of success. We analyze such contests as generalized aggregative potential games and characterize their Nash equilibria. We show that affirmative action equalizes equilibrium payoffs without causing any loss of aggregate welfare. It enhances the welfare and effort levels of agents facing high effort cost. Thus, affirmative action engenders equality without having any detrimental effects on efficiency, at least when the number of agents involved are large. It does, however, reduce aggregate effort in society.

Published by Sergey Kumkov
May 6, 2021

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

 

May 6, 2021 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Montreal Time, UTC -4)

Buyer direct financing under supplier disruption risk

Xiao Huang – John Molson School of Business, Concordia University, Canada

Xiao Huang

Webinar link
Webinar ID: 881 6070 4034
Passcode: 095916

We consider a dyadic supply chain in which a large and creditworthy buyer procures from a capital-constrained supplier subject to disruption risk. The buyer may offer direct financing (BDF) to the supplier with customized payment terms (PE) and tailored interest rates (TR). We analyze the value and interplay of these elements by characterizing equilibrium contractual terms under several BDF contracts with different PE and TR potentials.

Published by Sergey Kumkov
April 28, 2021

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Apr 29, 2021 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Montreal time, UTC -4)

Team collaboration in innovation contests

Sidika Tunc Candogan – School of Management, University College London, United Kingdom

Sidika Tunc Candogan

Webinar link
Webinar ID : 962 7774 9870
Passcode : 285404

 

In an innovation contest, an organizer elicits solutions to an innovation-related problem from a group of solvers. Although solvers are capable of developing individual solutions and making individual submissions, if the organizer encourages collaboration, solvers may collaborate as teams and make team submissions. Motivated from different policies adopted by various crowdsourcing platforms (e.g., InnoCentive, Topcoder, and 99designs), we identify conditions under which the organizer can benefit from team submissions. By examining equilibrium outcomes of a game-theoretic model, we show that when the organizer seeks high-novelty solutions to a nondecomposable problem (e.g., design challenges at InnoCentive), the organizer can benefit from team submissions despite the decrease in solvers’ efforts. Yet, when the organizer seeks low-novelty solutions to a nondecomposable problem (e.g., logo design challenges at 99designs), the organizer may not benefit from team submissions. We further show that when the organizer seeks low-novelty or high-novelty solutions to a decomposable problem (e.g., software challenges at Topcoder), the organizer can benefit from team submissions, but under some conditions. Finally, we also analyze when solvers can benefit from collaborating as teams because the organizer’s benefit from team submissions hinges upon solvers’ decisions. We show that unless there emerges synergy within teams, solvers can benefit from collaborating as teams because collaboration reduces solvers’ incentive to exert effort.

Published by Sergey Kumkov
April 22, 2021

Dear Colleagues,

 

Dynamic Games and Applications is planning the following special issues:

 

Modeling and Control of Epidemics

Guest Editors: Quanyan Zhu, Elena Gubar, Eitan Altman

Submission Deadline: extended to June 15, 2021

 

Dynamic Games and Social Networks

Guest Editors: Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli, Paolo Pin, Simon Weidenholzer

Submission Deadline: June 30, 2021  

 

Multi-agent Dynamic Decision Making and Learning

Guest editors:  Konstantin Avrachenkov, Vivek S. Borkar, U. Jayakrishnan Nair

Submission Deadline: June 30, 2021 

 

Dynamic Games in Environmental Economics and Management

Guest Editors: Ngo Van Long, Florian Wagener

Submission Deadline: June 30, 2021

 

Learning and Computations in Games & Economics

Guest Editors: Mehryar Mohri, Vianney Perchet

 

Submission Deadline: October 15, 2021

Published by Sergey Kumkov
April 19, 2021

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Apr 22, 2021 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Montreal time, UTC -4)

Interdiction games on graphs

Margarida Carvalho – Department of Computer Science and Operations Research, Université de Montréal, Canada